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TAXATION OF STOCK TRANSFERS
New York levied a stock transfer tax to be paid by the seller
on "all sales, agreements to sell or memoranda of sales and all de-
liveries or transfers of shares." Plaintiffs, New York brokers, nego-
tiated by interstate communication a sale to dealers in Philadelphia
and Washington, D.C. The sale was consummated by mailing for
collection to banks in these cities sight drafts with the stock certificates
attached. Held, by a 4-3 decision, the imposition of the New York
tax upon these transfers did not violate the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution. O'Kane v. State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E. (2d) 905
(1940).
The exemption from taxation, by the states, of interstate sales
was established by Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). While
limitation of this principle developed, the premise stood until quite
recently. But the conflict between increased need for local revenue
(plus recognition of the principle that interstate commerce must pay
its own way) and maintenance of immunity of interstate commerce
from state regulation required a new approach to the problem.
In a series of cases, involving net and gross income taxes, starting
with Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
a new test was used. Will the tax, if sustained, involve a risk of
subjecting interstate commerce to multiple or other tax burdens not
born by local commerce? In sustaining the use-tax, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the mere possibility of multiple taxation
was insufficient to invalidate the tax. It was said that it would be
time enough to decide the question when a case of actual double tax-
ation was presented. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167
(1939). In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 15 IND. L. 3.
316 (1940), a sales tax upon an interstate sale imposed by the
state of the buyer was sustained, upon analogy to the use-tax. In
this case for the first time an attempt was made to explain the refusal
to apply the multiple burden test to sales and use taxes, the ground
being that these taxes are conditioned upon a local activity. But the
economic burden is equally great whether the taxes are in the form of
a tax upon a sale or a tax upon gross income. And as economic bur-
den, or competitive discrimination, is the only basis for the multiple
burden test, the attempted distinction appears fallacious.
The holding in the O'Kane case is a logical extension of the doc-
trine of the Berwind-White case, upon which the majority bases its
opinion. The possibility of multiple taxation is equally great in either
case. And no case of actual double taxation is here involved. But if
both cases stand, a case wherein double taxation actually occurs will
soon arise. The position which the U.S. Supreme Court will take re-
mains uncertain. It might allow both the state of origin and the
state of destination to tax. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
However, this seems unlikely in view of the repeated language de-
nouncing multiple taxation. It has been argued that the proper
solution is to allow only the state of destination to tax interstate
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sales. Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52
HARV. L. REV. 617. The contention here is that to allow the seller
state to tax gives a competitive advantage to states without or with
very low sales taxes, while to allow only buyer states to tax affects
all sellers equally. A practical answer to this contention is that if
taxes imposed by seller states puts the sellers at a competitive dis-
advantage, such taxes are not likely to be either large or numerous.
(In the O'Kane case the tax was expedient only because of the ab-
sence of effective out-of-state competition with the New York Stock
Exchange.) See Note (1940) 8 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 132. These con-
flicting arguments, and the apparent inconsistency of the Supreme
Court in decisions involving taxation of interstate commerce, lend force
to another alternative. This is the position of Justices Black, Frank-
furter, and Douglas, that the solution lies not in judicial action, but
in federal legislation. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S.
176, 183 (1940). F. L., Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
VIOLATION OF STATUTE BARS COMPENSATION
Plaintiff was employed by defendant solely as a "loader" in de-
fendant's mine. Finding an electrically operated machine in the way
of his work, the plaintiff moved it, instead of calling a skilled worker
hired to handle this equipment. During this moving the plaintff was
injured. Held, compensation denied. In operating this electrical ma-
chine, the plaintiff violated a statutory duty and thereby took himself
out of the "course of his employment."It
The general rule in workmen's compensation actions is in accord
with the principal case.2 However, many jurisdictions refuse to allow
a mere violation of such a statute to bar compensation and hold that
unless the employee was guilty of "wilful misconduct" or "wilful fail-
ure or refusal to perform"3 a statutory duty he was not acting out-
side the course of his employment and may recover.4 This gives to
the violation only the effect of negligence, which does not bar recov-
1 Kozak v. Reilly Coal Co., 15 A (2d) 531 (Pa. Super. 1940). The statut-
ory duty involved is contained in General Rule 12 of Article XXV of
the Bituminous Mining Act. Pa. Laws 1911, p. 827 Pa. Statutes
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 52, §1292: "All persons are forbidden to med-
dle or tamper in any way with any electric or signal wires, or
any other equipment in or about the mine."
2 Bugh v. Employers' Reinsurance Corp., 63 F. (2d) 36 (C.C.A. 5th,
1933); Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co., 217 Mich. 508, 187 N.W. 352,
23 A.L.R. 1153 (1922); Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290
Pa. 480, 139 Atl. 192 (1927).
3 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1208: "No compensation shall
be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's .
wilful failure or refusal to perform any statutory duty . . . "2 Cf.
Va. Acts 1918, c. 400, § 14.
4Union Colliery Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Ill. 561, 132 N.E.
200, 23 A.L.R. 1150 (1921); Nester v. H. Korn Baking Co., 194
Iowa 1270, 190 N.W. 949 (1922); Rushville School Township v.
Mock, 86 Ind. App. 307, 157 N.E. 366 (1927).
